My dissertation focuses on the Critique of Pure Reason and, in particular, the Transcendental Deduction. There is a near universal consensus that the Deduction aims to establish a fit between our most basic concepts (viz., the categories) and objects in the world. But even experts on the first Critique find little else to agree upon on this score. I argue for a radical reframing of Kant's Deduction. It does not aim to establish that there is a fit between the categories and the world. It establishes that there is only one appropriate way to establish such a fit. This new framing of the Deduction sheds light on puzzles about its proof structure and role in Kant’s larger project. More importantly, by illustrating how the Deduction appraises an allegedly exhaustive series of competing methods for justifying the categories’ application to objects, this reading renders explicit the grounds of Kant’s claims about the limits of metaphysical inquiry. 

My dissertation research forms the basis for several projects that I am currently developing. These projects fit into two general lines of inquiry: (1) The first consists of attempts to formulate novel connections between recent work on Kant’s philosophy of mathematics and the Transcendental Deduction; (2) The second clarifies the relationship between the Deduction and other parts of the Critique of Pure Reason (esp. the Paralogisms and Amphiboly). These projects are described in greater detail on my Research Statement, which is available upon request. 

In the future, I plan to extend my research in three directions. 

1. My research has  focused on the justification of Kant’s claims about the limits of human knowledge. So I have set aside important questions about the ethical motivations for these limits. It is widely recognized that, for Kant, knowledge of certain metaphysical truths is incompatible with participation in genuine ethical practice or deliberation. In the future, I plan to investigate this incompatibility further and the broader conception of ethical conduct that it implies.    

2. I plan to examine the way in which the import of (metaphysical) ignorance for ethical conduct gets taken up in the nineteenth-century and, in particular, by Nietzsche. Kant’s practical grounding of metaphysical beliefs, Nietzsche claims, undermines the genuine achievement of the first Critique. I plan to unpack the implications of this worry for Nietzsche’s conception of the aims of critical epistemological reflection. Nietzsche’s skeptical reconception of this project is, I believe, performed in service to a form of ethical pedagogy he initially sketches in Schopenhauer as Educator. 

3. Hegel’s Logic incorporates aspects of both Kant’s critical epistemology and pre-Kantian metaphysics. But questions remain about the faults he finds in Kant’s project and the precise ways that he intends to improve upon them. I plan to clarify how Hegel’s Logic revises the Kantian approach to assessing our epistemic possibilities. I hope to show that Hegel’s form of epistemological criticism inverts the direction-of-fit found in Kantian critique. Instead of assessing the feasibility of epistemic ends in light of facts about our epistemic means, Hegel assesses the fitness of our means (i.e., concepts) in light of facts about our epistemic ends.

1. Hettig-Role, Kasey. "Swimming Problems: Hegel, Kant, and the Demand for Meta-Theory."  European Journal of Philosophy. Forthcoming.

2. Hettig-Rolfe, Kasey (2022). "François Raffoul, Thinking the Event." Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43 (1):187-190.

Under Review

1. TBA

Preparing

1. "Abstraction in the B Deduction: Or, Kant's Attack on Pure Apperception"